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BRIEF 0F RESP0tTDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 17514 
In this appeal Plaintiff/Appellant has petitioned this 
court to review the judgment of the trial court regarding the 
d~stribution of property and obligations accumulated by the 
parties during the marriage; the award of alioony; and the trial 
court's failure to award reasonable attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following extensive pre-trial negotiations and pre-
trial order, this matter was tried before the Honorable Peter 
~. Leary. ::luring two days of trial, the court heard testimony 
from seven witnesses, including four expert witnesses testifying 
as to the value of personal property accumulated by the parties; 
received into evidence eighteen exhibits; and subsequently took 
the matter under advisement for a period in excess of 60 days. 
Based upon the evidence presented at the time of trial, plain-
tiff was awarded real and personal property valued at $26 7, 246. 00, 
or 66~~ of the total, and defendant was awarded real and personal 
Property valued at $135,540.00, or 34% of the total. All real 
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and personal property awarded in the decree of divorce was valued 
either by appraisal or by stipulation of the parties. 
The court further ordered that Plaintiff pay 
$10,631.00 of the debts and obligations incurred during the 
marriage or 58~~ of the total, and that defendant pay $7,567.00 
of the debts and obligations so incurred, or 42".~ of the total, 
not the 72".~ - 23~~ split alledged in appellants brief. 
In addition the court awarded Plaintiff $400.00 per 
month alimony, to be paid for a period of 48 months, with the 
right of Plaintiff to petition the court for an extension of 
payment of alimony. Furthermore, Defendant was awarded a lien 
against the home of the parties for his share of the equity, to 
be paid by Plaintiff to Defendant upon occurrence of the first 
of the following events: re-marriage of the Plaintiff; 
Plaintiff ceases to reside in the home or any part thereof is 
rented: a non-related male resides in the home; the minor child 
graduates from high school or is otherwise emancipated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff has petitioned this court to remand the 
case for a reconsideration of the property distribution; debt 
distribution; award of alimony; and award of attorney's fees. 
In the alternative, Plaintiff requests this court to review 
the evidence presented at the trial and fashion its own award. 
It is the position of the Defendant/Respondent that 
the judgment of the trial court is consistent with the pre-trial 
order and the extensive evidence presented at the time of trial; 
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chat the trial court went to great length to review and consider 
che evidence; and therefore, the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed, and this court ought to award Defendant 
his costs and attorney's fees on appeal. 
STATEHENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married in San Antonio, Texas on 
June 27, 1952. Four children were born as issue of the 
marriage, all of whom have now reached the age of eighteen years, 
and none of whom are living with either the Plaintiff or the 
Defendant. At the time of the marriage, Defendant had completed 
his Junior year at Rice University, and was completing 
studies for his bachelor's degree in Engineering. While com-
pleting his studies, and in order to assist in supporting his 
family, Defendant worked part-time during the nine month school 
year, and full-time during the summer months. (Tr .168; R. 542.) 
Following his graduation from Rice University, 
Defendant became employed with Chance-Vought Aircraft, a company 
now known as E-Systems, his present employer. At the time of 
the divorce, Defendant's net monthly income was $1,887.00 
(Exhibit 29-D), which sum, after the payment of alimony to the 
Plaintiff, is reduced to $1,487.00. Although Plaintiff was not 
employed, she had independent income in the sum of $800.00 per 
month from a trust standing in her name at National Bank of 
Commerce, San Antonio, Texas (Exhibit 22-D), and additionally 
was receiving $600.00 per month in stock dividends from 
shares of National Bancshares stock standing in her name 
-3-
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(Pretrial Order, page 4, paragraph R), for a combined gross 
monthly income of $1,400. 00. After taking into consideration 
the $400. 00 per month alimony payment from Defendant, Plaintiff 
has available to her a gross monthly income of $1,800.00. This 
does not take into consideration income she may earn from future 
employment. 
Appellant's brief goes into great detail regarding 
depletion of the legacy she received at the time of her father's 
death. The fact of the matter is, and based on the pleadings 
and evidence submitted at the time of trial, the legacy received 
by Plaintiff and placed in trust with National Bank of Collllllerce 
on May 28, 1956, was valued at that time at $66,386.01. 
(Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Memorandum - Page 1). 
The principal balance of the trust on March 31, 1980 
was valued at $87,942.00 (Exhibit 22-D), and at the time of 
trial, the trust was valued at $98,126.00. (Tr.220; R.594.) 
This in spite of the fact that there were distributions from 
the trust during a 23 1/2 year period amounting to $146,599.10. 
(Exhibit 22-D) Plaintiff would like this court to believe that 
the entire $146,599.10 was contributed to the marriage of the 
parties for the purpose of keeping body and soul together, and 
that Defendant contributed little or nothing to the marriage. 
The uncontroverted evidence, however, illustrates rather vividly 
that during their 29 year marriage, Defendant was always 
employed on a full-time basis, with the exception of two years 
when he was completing his education and working part-time. 
(Tr.168; R.542.) As a result of his employment, Defendant 
-4-
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contributed in excess of $500,000oOO to the support and main-
tenance of the family unito (Tr.174 & 175; R.548 & 549.) As 
one would reasonably expect from a marriage of 29 years, 
Defendant's income and the distribution from Plaintiff's trust 
were largely co-mingled and used by the parties to manage and 
pay the expenses of the family unit and provide the family 
with some of the luxuries in life. (Tr.176; R.550.) 
During their marriage, the parties accumulated a 
sizeable estate of real and personal property. In addition, 
during the marriage, Plaintiff inherited some antiques and other 
miscellaneous items of personal property. The only evidence 
before the court with regard to the value of the real and 
personal property of the parties was the testimony of expert 
witnesses, the exhibits received at the time of trial, and the 
testimony of the Defendant. Throughout these lengthy divorce 
proceedings, Plaintiff has had repeated opportunities to present 
evidence or proffer testimony as to the extent and estimated 
value of the real and personal property inherited and accumulated 
by the parties during the marriage. On February 13, 1980, 
Defendant issued Interrogatories specifically directed at having 
Plaintiff provide information as to the extent and estimated 
value of the real and personal property owned by the parties. 
She failed to answer the Interrogatorieso Defendant filed a 
motion to compell Plaintiff to answer the requested Interrogatories. 
The court ordered Plaintiff to file written answer to the 
Interrogatories, however, Plaintiff failed to abide by the court 
order. In the pre-trial order Plaintiff was again ordered to 
provide Defendant with estimated values of items of personal 
-5-
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property accumulated during the marriage. Again Plaintiff failei 
to abide by the court order. 
The Defendant on the other hand, consistent with the 
pre-trial order, arranged for appraisers to inventory and value 
the personal property of the parties. In addition, Defendant 
arranged for a stock broker to testify as to the value of stocks 
and other marketable securities owned by the parties at the time 
of trial. Even though the court had specifically ordered the 
appraisal of the parties personal property in the home, Pla~tili 
refused to cooperate, and in fact made it extremely difficult 
for Defendant and the appraiser to inventory and value the 
property located in the home. The appraisers collectively valued 
the personal property in the home at $126,781.00 (Exhibits 16-D 
18-D; 19-D), excluding a substantial amount of sterling silver 
which was not available at the time of the appraisal. Defendant 
in his inventory of the personal property located in the home, 
including the sterling silver not viewed by the appraisers, 
estimated the total value of personal property in the home at 
$161,113.00 (Exhibit 21-D). If Defendant's estimate is 
reduced by $16,500, the value he attributed to the silver and 
included in his estimate, but not included in the value arrived 
at by the appraisers, Defendant's estimate now reduced to 
$144,613.00 is very similar to the professional appraisals. 
In his suggested division of marital estate, and of 
the items of real and personal property not stipulated to, 
Defendant requested and received 1,214 shares of E-Systems 
Stock; his ESY Pension; his ESOP Retirement Plan; and some items 
of personal property valued at $7,244.00. The value of the Hems 
-6-
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awarded to the Defendant, including his one-half equity in the 
home and some miscellaneous items of personal property awarded 
ryefendant in the pre-trial order totals $135, 540. 00. (Exhibit 
31-D). ".'he value of property awarded to Plaintiff pursuant 
tesrimony at the time of trial; Exhibit 31-D; the pre-trial 
order; and stipulation of the parties totals $267,246.00. 
On the basis of $402, 786. 00, the total value of property at 
the time of trial, Plaintiff was awarded 66i', and Defendant 
was awarded 34%. If Plaintiff's inherited property is 
ignored, she still received $98,030.00 or 42% of the property 
accumulated by the parties and Defendant received $135, 540. 00 
or 58"1,. Furthermore, the ESY Pension Plan and the ESOP 
~etirement Plan cumulatively valued on Exhibit 31-D at 
S39,635.00 is not available for monthly distribution to the 
Defendant until age 60, thereby substantially reducing the 
lump sum value and liquidity of the property awarded to the 
Defendant. 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND WAS 
:-!ISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
A. The Standard For This Court's Review Of The 
~cree Of Divorce. 
This court has on many occasions held that an action 
in a divorce is largely an equitable proceeding. Wilson v 
~. 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956). There are many 
holdings that this court may review cases of this nature and 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court under proper 
-7-
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circumstances. (See, Wilson v Wilson, supra.) 
In Christensen v Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 263, 444 
P.2d 511 (1968) this court recognized the unique oosition of 
the trial judge when it concluded: 
Even though it is the established rule that 
divorce cases being in equity, it the duty 
of this court to review and weigh the 
evidence,2 it is equally true that we have 
invariably recognized the advantaged posi-
tion of the trial judge and given deference 
to his findings and judgment, declaring 
that they should not be upset unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against 
them, or unless the decree works.such an 
injustice that equity and good conscience 
demand that it be revised. 
444 P.2dat 512. 
In Bader v Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P. 2d 150, (1968) 
this court in again recognizing the advantaged position of 
the trial judge in matters of allocating property and income, 
the court stated: 
It would lead to intolerable instability of 
judgments if this court should assume the 
prerogative and accept the responsibility 
of merely second guessing a trial judge who 
has done a conscientious job of attempting 
to make a just and equitable allocation of 
the property and income of the parties in 
regard to alimony and support money, as the 
trial judge appears to have done here. It 
is due to this fact, taken into considera-
tion with the nature of the trial judge's 
authority and duty, and his advantaged 
position, that in such matters he is 
allowed a comparatively wide latitude of 
discretion which will not be disturbed in 
the absence of a clear abuse, a circum-
stance which we have not found here. 
424 P. 2d at 151. 
-8-
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B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Awarding 
~Unwarranted Majority Of The Property To ~r. Warren. 
Plaintiff alleges that the trial court adopted 
without modification the proposed distribution of marital 
property pursuant to Exhibit 31-D. Plaintiff, either prior 
to the trial or during the trial made absolutely no effort 
to submit either to opposing counsel, or the trial court, any 
evidence or testimony regarding the value of the real and 
personal property owned by the parties, nor did she provide 
any evidence with respect to what she believed would be an 
equitable property distribution. (Tr.259; R.633). 
Plaintiff had many opportunities to present evidence 
or testimony regarding values and proposed distribution of 
property accumulated during the marriage. In fact, on 
February 13, 1980, Defendant served Interrogatories upon 
Plaintiff specifically directed to obtain that information. 
She failed to answer the Interrogatories. On April 28, 1980, 
she was ordered by the court to file answers, but again she 
failed to do so. In the Pre-Trial Order dated July 22, 1980, 
she was again ordered to provide her estimated value of items 
of personal property accumulated during the marriage, and her 
proposed distribution of property. (Pre-Trial Order. Page 6). 
Again, Plaintiff failed to comply with the court's order. 
It would, therefore, appear a bit presumptuous on 
the part of Plaintiff to now fault the trial court for pre-
sumably having weighed in its decision, the testimony of 
Defendant and expert witnesses, each of whom provided testimony 
-9-
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regarding the value of personal property of the parties. 
Plaintiff should not now be allowed to petition this court 
and attempt to discredit the well reasoned judgment of the 
trial court. 
Plaintiff, on page 10 of her brief alleges that 
Defendant's estimated value of personal property grossly 
exaggerates the actual value of the property. How can such 
a statement be given any credibility, particularly in light 
of the fact that Plaintiff has made absolutely no effort to 
either value the personal property herself or to have the 
property appraised by outside independent appraisers. 
Defendant, on the other hand, made a sincere effort 
to itemize and value all of the items of personal property 
located in the home of the parties. His effort in that regard 
resulted in an estimated value of $161,113.00. (Exhibit 21-D). 
In addition, Defendant arranged for independent appraisers, 
at his own expense, and as directed by the Honorable Judge 
Rigtrup at the pre-trial conference to appraise the personal 
property of the parties, which resulted in an estimated value 
of $126, 781. 00. (Exhibit D-16, D-18 and D-19). It should be 
noted that because the items were not available, the appraisers 
excluded certain items of sterling silver place settings 
which Defendant had valued at $16,500.00. (Exhibit 21-D). 
If the sterling silver is deducted from Defendant's estimated 
value per Exhibit 21-D, Defendant's estimate is only $17 ,832.00 
higher than the appraisals submitted by the experts at the 
time of trial. 
-10-
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The trial judge in his determination as to the 
disposition of the real and personal property of the parties 
:nust have recognized that Defendant's estimates were his own 
opinion, and that perhaps he had little professional expertise 
in appraising personal property of that nature. However, the 
Court also seemed to recognize that the estimates of Defendant 
were very similar to the appraisals submitted by the expert 
witnesses. Therefore, some credibility must be given his 
estimates, particularly in light of the fact that Plaintiff 
has never made any attempt to provide estimates or expert 
testimony to the contrary. 
As a result of the evidence and testimony at the 
time of trial, and the stipulation of the parties as contained 
in the Pre-Trial Order, Plaintiff was awarded stocks, bonds, 
and other liquid, marketable securities valued at the time of 
trial at $1l2,091.00 (Tr.220; R.594, Tr. 221; R.595, Tr •. 243; R.617) 
and awarded antique furnishings valued at $5 7, 125. 00. 
(Exhibit 21-D). Additionally, Plaintiff was awarded household 
furnishings, jewelry, furs, Saab automobile and one-half of 
the equity in the home for an additional award of $98, 030. 00. 
(Exhibit 31-D), for a total award of $267 ,246.00. 
Defendant on the other hand received his E-Systems 
stock, his non-liquid retirement benefits, one-half of the 
equity in the home and some miscellaneous items of personal 
property, for a total value of $135, 540. 00. (Exhibit 31-D). 
Of the total property owned by the parties at the time of trial, 
Plaintiff was awarded property valued at $267,246.00, or 66% of 
-11-
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the total, and Defendant was awarded property valued at 
$135,540.00 or 34% of the total. If the stocks, securities 
and antiques awarded to Plaintiff valued at $169,216.00 are 
deleted from Plaintiff's award, she still received property 
valued at $98,030.00, or 42% of the total property. 
Plaintiff attempts to discredit the trial court's 
decision by alleging the trial judge misunderstood the value 
of the retirement benefits of Defendant as set forth in 
Exhibit 31-D. The fact of the matter is, however, the trial 
court had in its possession, and it is part of this trial 
record, a published copy of Defendant's retirement benefits, 
Therefore, the trial judge was well aware of the fact that 
the values to be attached to Defendant's retirement benefits 
must be present values, not estimated values some twenty years 
into the future. It was for this reason and on that basis 
that the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, recognizing that these 
retirement benefits were not to be available to Defendant 
until retirement, reduced the inflated future values to present 
values. 
The trial court, in addressing the question as to the 
division of personal property indicated that it may either 
require an appraisal or in the alternative divide the property 
based on documentary evidence and testimony. (Tr.261 R.635). 
In the final analysis, the trial court in fact did not request 
an item-by-item appraisal of the personal property located in 
the home, presumably because of the expense involved, (Tr· 259; 
R. 633) and in fact made its distribution based upon the evidence 
-12-
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and testimony provided at the time of trial. (Tr.261; R.635). 
It is certainly a well recognized fact that the trial 
court does not have unlimited discretion in allocating personal 
property and financial resources in matters of this nature. 
However, it is also a well recognized fact that the trial 
court does have considerable latitude in allocating personal 
property and financial resources, and the decision of the trial 
court in that regard will not be changed, unless its decision 
works such inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. 
Wilson v Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956) or unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of the 
trial court. Adams v Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979). 
In her brief, Plaintiff, in citing the case of 
Read v Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979) suggests that there were 
some questions regarding the accuracy of estimates of value of 
personal property, and on that basis the case ought to be 
remanded to the trial court. The fact of the matter is, however, 
there was no confusion on the part of the trial judge, with the 
exception of the value of Defendant's retirement benefits. 
(Tr.256, 257; R.630,631). In that regard, a printed copy of 
Defendant's retirement plan was provided to the court, consistent 
with its order. (Tr.267; R.641), and presumably used in his 
deliberation. All of the remaining property of the parties, 
however, including the home, stocks, bonds, furs, jewelry, 
furnishings and fixtures were appraised by experts, including a 
real estate agent, stock broker, furrier, professional jeweler 
and professional estate appraiser. In addition, Defendant 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
offered his best opinion as to th 1 f e va ues o the furniture 
and furnishings located in the home. There was no contra-
dictory evidence before the court. 
Furthermore, Read v Read should be distinguished 
from this case in that in the J:Zead case there was no evidence 
before the trial court with regard to certain i terns of personal 
property, and the findings of the court were inconsistent with 
the evidence presented at the time of trial. In addition,~ 
the Read case the court awarded the wife 90% of the personal 
Property and awarded the husband lOi'. of the personal nroperty. 
In remanding the case, this court recognized that the property 
distribution was not equitable, and that the trial court should 
obtain additional evidence regarding the value of certain items 
of personal property. 
Plaintiff suggests that the detailed itemized valua· 
tion prepared by defendant and verified by qualified profes-
sional appraisers is of no value. Plaintiff further suggests 
that the valuation of the jewelry at $19,886.00 is without any 
evidence of present market or actual value. To even suggest sue' 
a thing is not only to cast doubt on the expertise of the expert 
witness who so testified, but furthermore to contradict counsel 
for Plaintiff who recognized that Defendant's expert witness 
was a "well qualified gemologist". (Tr. 32;T.406). Furthermore, 
the jeweler testified that the basis for his valuation at the 
time the appraisal was done was replacement cost, and further· 
more, he testified that the value of gem stones and precious 
metal had been subject to tremendous increases in value since 
-14-
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:he date of the aporaisal of August 2, 1978. (Tr.3l;T405), 
(Exhibit D-19) · The appraiser of the contents of the home, 
:iased upon a visual inspection and based upon numerous photo-
graphs taken during his visit (Exhibit 17-D) testified and 
submitted his written estimate to the effect that on a piece 
by piece sale, the antique furnishings in the home, awarded 
to the Plaintiff, would bring near $100,000.00. That was the 
uncontroverted evidence before the court, and was not rebutted 
by any evidence of the Plaintiff. 
This court recognized the advantaged position of the 
trial judge to review and weigh the evidence in De Vas v Noble, 
13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962), when it held: 
Due to his function as the determiner of 
the facts and his advantaged position in 
close proximity to the witnesses and the 
trial, it is his privilege to be the ex-
clusive judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight to be given the 
evidence and the facts to be found there-
from. 
369 E2d at 293. 
Plaintiff, in her brief, suggests that if the total 
value of real and personal property awarded to Plaintiff is 
reduced by the values assigned to her trust, National Banc-
shares stock and antiques, that Plaintiff's award of real 
and personal property by the trial court would be reduced 
to 16% of the remaining estate. 
The fact of the matter is, however, that if the 
trust and National Bancshares stock valued at $112,091.00, and 
the antiques valued at $57,125.00 are deducted from the value 
of real and personal property awarded to Plaintiff, she was 
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still awarded $98,030.00 in real and personal property and 
Defendant was awarded $135,540.00 in real and personal prop en: 
which represents a 42% - 58% split. Even given the worst case, 
the 42% - 58% split, this property settlement is well within 
the discretion of the trial court, particularly given the 
fact that in reality Plaintiff was awarded real and 
personal property valued at $26 7, 246. 00. Plaintiff suggests 
that the property distribution by the trial court imposes 
a penalty upon the Plaintiff. In that regard counsel cites 
the case of Read v Read (Supra) . In the Read case, the trial 
court awarded Plaintiff 90% of the real and personal property 
and Defendant was awarded 10%. In finding the trial court's 
distribution inequitable this court concluded: 
When a marriage has failed, a court's duty 
is to consider the various factors relating 
to the situation and to arrange the best 
possible allocation of the property and 
economic resources of the parties so that 
the parties . . . can pursue their lives 
in as hapoy and useful manner as possible. 
If it appears that the decree is so dis-
cordant with an equitable allocation that 
it will more likely lead to further dif-
ficulties and distress than to serve the 
desired objective, then a reappraisal of 
the decree must be undertaken. 
594 P2d 872. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Pope v Pope, 589 P2d 
753 (Utah 1978) as authority for a property distribution 
awarding 65% of the real and personal property to the Plain-
tiff/ wife, and 35% to the Defendant/ husband. This court 
upheld the decision of the trial court on the basis that the 
Defendant/ husband received income producing property. 
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In that regard, it should be pointed out, that of 
che total real and personal property awarded to the Plaintiff, 
in the amount of $267,246.00, $112,091.00 represents stocks, 
~ands and other income producing, readily marketable securi-
ties. Of the total property awarded to the Defendant, in 
the amount of $135,540.00, only his shares in E-Systems 
valued at $5 7, 361. 00 are income producing and readily market-
able. The value attributed to his pension and retirement fund 
is not available to him at this time. 
The decree of divorce in this matter, based upon all 
of the evidence, is well within the discretionary authority of 
the trial court. The court awarded Plaintiff 66% ($267 ,246.00) 
of the total real and personal property of the parties,or 42% 
($98, 030. 00) of the total property if Plaintiff's stocks, 
bonds and antiques are excluded from the property distribution 
calculation. In the case of Cox v Cox, 532 P2d 994 (Utah 1975), 
this court held that a property distribution of one-third to 
the wife and two-thirds to the husband was not an abuse of 
the court's discretion. In Cox the parties had been married for 
approximately 15 years and had four children. During the 
marriage, the Plaintiff/wife had worked and had helped 
Defendant/husband complete dental school. After graduation, 
she assisted Defendant and was employed in his practice as 
a receptionist and bookkeeper. At the time of trial, the 
evidence indicated that the parties had accumulated personal 
property valued at $210,000.00. The trial court awarded one-
third of the personal property to the Plaintiff/wife and two-
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thirds to the Defendant/husband. I h ld" h n up o ing t e trial coun' 
decision, this court held: 
~ecause o~ the ~ariableness and complexities 
i~volved in family troubles, there is no 
firm rule or formula that can be uniformly 
applied in all cases in the legal surgery 
ne~essa:y to severing such relationships 
which will best serve the desired objective 
of allocating economic resources so that 
the parties involved can reconstruct their 
lives in the most happy and useful manner. 
However, as an aid in that endeavor in 
the past courts have often resorted.to a 
general "rule of thumb", of one-third to 
the wife and two-thirds to the husband . 
Upon our survey of the circumstances of 
these parties we see no reason to believe 
that the application of that general rule 
is so inequitable or unjust that we should 
interfere therewith. 
532 P.2d at 996. 
Plaintiff in her brief alleges that the decree 
leaves little but grossly overvalued personal property to t~ 
unemployable, uneducated wife and mother of twenty-nine years. 
A review of the evidence presented at the time of 
trial simply does not substantiate such a conclusion. 
Although it is true that Plaintiff has not been employed 
outside the home since her marriage to Defendant, she does 
have a high school diploma and did attend the University of 
Texas for one and one-half years. (Tr.93; R.467). With respect 
to Plaintiff's allegation that the real and personal property 
is grossly overvalued, the evidence and testimony proffered 
at the time of trial and previously referred to herein 
certainly proves that statement to be without merit. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that the values 
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attached to Defendant's ESOP Retirement Plan, valued at $19, 388. 00 
and his ESY Pension Plan, valued at $20,247.00 created a ques-
tion in the mind of the trial judge. Although it is true there 
was some confusion about Defendant's accessibility to his 
retirement plan and his pension plan, those matters were resolved 
in the mind of the trial judge when Defendant, pursuant to the 
court's order, provided both counsel for the Plaintiff and 
the trial judge, within 48 hours after the trial, a copy of 
£-Systems Employee Handbook, which explained in detail the 
retirement benefits of Defendant. (Tr.266,267; R.640,641). 
The E-Systems Employee Handbook made available to 
the court verifies that the $19,388.00 in the ESOP Retirement 
Plan is available to Defendant only upon the following conditions; 
(1) one year after his date of termination from E-Systems or 
(2) at such time as he retires after age 60. The value of 
Defendant's pension plan was determined at the pre-trial 
conference conducted by the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. Judge 
Rigtrup and counsel for both parties recognized and agreed 
chat the future value of Defendant's pension plan must be 
reduced to a present value basis. Judge Rigtrup, over the 
objection of counsel for Defendant used an interest rate of 
8% per annum in order to reduce the future value of the pension 
plan to a present value of $20,247.00. (Pre-Trial Order P.2). 
Had Judge Rigtrup used a rate of interest more in line with 
current interest rates, such as 15% per annum as requested 
by counsel for Defendant, the present value of the pension 
Plan would have been reduced to $7, 879. 00. In her brief 
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Plaintiff suggests that the low 8% interest rate greatly under. 
values the retirement fund. The fact of the matter is, howeve: 
the opposite is true. The greatly understated rate of interes: 
in fact overvalues the present value of Defendant's pension 
plan. 
Hith respect to whether or not the ESY Pension Plan 
and the ESOP Retirement Plan ought to be property subject to 
distribution, it should be noted that Defendant made that 
information available to counsel for the Plaintiff and includec 
those values as part of his proposed property settlement 
contained in Exhibit 31-D. It would be naive to think that 
the trial court did not consider these amounts in its deter-
mination of what would be a fair and equitable distribution of 
the real and personal property of the parties. 
C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering 
That Mrs. Warren Pay A Disproportionate Amount Of The ~1arital 
Liabilities. 
In her brief, Plaintiff alleges that the trial court 
adopted without modification the proposed division of marital 
obligations submitted by Defendant on Exhibit 33-D. The fact 
of the matter is, however, that the trial court did not adopt, 
without change, the proposed division as set forth in Exhibit 
33-D, in that in addition to the $4,604.00 Defendant proposed 
he should pay, he was ordered to pay the mortgage arrears 
in the sum of $1, 003. 00, which amount was originally included 
in the amount proposed to be paid by Plaintiff, and 
additionally Defendant was ordered to pay income tax 
for Calendar year 1979, not reflected penalties and interest 
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in Exhibit 33-D, but part of the trial court's memorandum 
decision, in the sum of $1,960.00. Therefore, of the total 
debts and obligations in the sum of $18,198.00, Plaintiff was 
ordered to pay $10,631.00 and Defendant was ordered to pay 
$7,567.00. 
In making its decision relative to the distribution 
of the obligations, the court obviously considered the testi-
mony of the parties. During examination, Plaintiff unequivo-
cally admitted that the balances due to Felt Buchorn and ZCMI 
represented her own personal accounts. (Tr.87,88; R.461,462). 
Additionally, Plaintiff admitted incurring for her own personal 
benefit, the charges on National Bank of Conunerce Master Charge, 
Valley Bank Visa and Master Charge, Castleton's, Makoff's, 
and Arent's. (Tr. 103-106; R.477-480). In fact, without excep-
tion, each of the obligations Plaintiff was ordered to pay 
she either agreed to pay or agreed were charges incurred by her 
personally for her benefit. In addition, in his testimony, 
Defendant testified that the charge accounts in question were 
either in the name of the Plaintiff or used exclusively by 
the Plaintiff (Tr. 183-184; R.557-558, Tr.187; R.561). 
When viewed in terms of the percentage of the total 
obligations each of the parties was ordered to pay, Plaintiff 
was ordered to pay $10,631.00 of the total of $18,198.00 of 
debts and obligations, or 58% of the total, not the 72% 
alleged by plaintiff in her brief. Additionally, Defendant 
was ordered to nay $7,567.00 of the debts and obligations, 
or 42% of the total. Furthermore, Plaintiff testified during 
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the trial that some of the obligations Defendant proposed be 
paid by Plaintiff in Exhibit 33-D, specifically Valley Bank anc 
Trust Visa and 'faster Charge, Felt Buchorn, and ZC~I had 
cumulatively been reduced at the time of trial in the amount 
of $1,553.00 (Tr.87; R.46l)(Tr.104;R.478). Taking that testi~c: 
into consideration, Plaintiff's share of the obligations is 
reduced and her percentage of total obligations she is requirea 
to pay drops to 55% and Defendant's share of obligations he 
is required to pay increases to 45%. Considering that 
practically all of the obligations were incurred by the Pla~-
tiff for her personal benefit, such a distribution is more 
than reasonable, and well within the discretion of the trial 
court. 
Plaintiff, in her brief, suggests that the Defend~t 
has a greater ability, based on the respective incomes of the 1 
parties, to pay a substantially greater portion of the obli-
gations of the parties. In fact, however, Plaintiff has a 
separate gross income of $1,800.00 per month, excluding any 
allowance for income she may earn from future employment, 
whereas Defendant has a net income of $1,487.00 per month. 
Plaintiff also alleges that the trial court erred 
by requiring her to pay one-half of the income tax deficit 
for calendar year 1979. It should be pointed out, and the 
trial court so recognized, that the $5,207.00 income tax 
deficit was in large part due to income Plaintiff had received 
by way of stock dividends and interest income from her trust 
and National Bancshares stock, and that Defendant's income 
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from his employer had in fact been subject to withholding 
the entire year. Therefore, the income realized by Plaintiff 
juosted the parties joint return into a substantially higher 
income tax bracket and as a consequence resulted in the 
~laintiff' s income being taxed at a substantially higher tax 
rate than would have been the case had this been the only 
income the parties had earned during calendar year 1979. 
Plaintiff further suggests that Defendant admitted 
~ving used credit cards for his benefit or for the benefit 
of the children. The fact of the matter is, and the record 
clearly so indicates, that Defendant admitted to two specific 
charges on the Valley Bank and Trust Company Visa and l1aster 
Char8e account. In the one instance the Defendant purchased 
a jacuzzi/whirlpool which was subsequently awarded to the 
Plaintiff and in the second instance the Defendant purchased 
a round-trip plane ticket for the parties' minor child. (Tr. 
186; it. 560). In fact throughout his testimony the Defendant 
specifically denied any knowledge of any of the credit card 
purchases. Furthermore, he denied having any personal know-
ledge as to the nature of the items purchased other than the 
fact they were purchased by the Plaintiff for the benefit of 
the Plaintiff. (Tr.187; R.561). 
The distribution of marital obligations by the trial 
court is certainly well within the court's discretionary 
powers. As noted in Baker,(Supra), the trial court has con-
siderable latitude in adjusting the financial affairs of 
parties in a divorce proceeding. In Christensen v Christensen, 
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444 P.2d 511 (Utah 1968), at page 512 this court held: 
Even though it is the established rule 
that divorce c~ses being in equity, it is 
the duty of this court to review and weigh 
the evidence, it is equally true that we 
have invariably recognized the advantaged 
position of the trial judge and given 
deference to his findings and judgment 
declaring that they should not be upset 
unless evidence clearly preponderates 
against them, or unless the decree works 
such an injustice that equity and con-
science demand that it be revised. 
The judgment of the trial court with respect to the 
distribution of the debts and obligations of the parties was 
not an abuse of the court's discretion. Plaintiff agreed to 
pay those obligations incurred solely by her. Plaintiff 
reaped the benefits of the purchases, since all of the 
personal property that was so acquired was awarded to the 
Plaintiff. 
D. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Awardir.: 
An Insufficient Amount Of Alimony For Too Limited A Period Of 
Time. 
The evidence shows that Plaintiff has independent 
income in the sum of $1,400.00 per month, (Exhibit 22-D) 
(Pre-Trial Order, page 4, paragraph R) , and receives alimony 
in the sum of $400.00 per month, for a total income of 
$1,800.00 per month. Defendant receives a net income, after 
payment of alimony, in the amount of $1,487.00. (Exhibit 29-D) 
Plaintiff in her brief grossly understates her 
income when she suggests her gross income to be $1,200.00 per 
month. Obviously Plaintiff is ignoring the evidence and 
d · 1 The fact of the matter is, that exhibits presente at tria . 
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plaintiff receives $800.00 per month income from her trust; 
5600. 00 per month income from stock dividends; and $400. 00 
per month alimony from the Defendant. It seems inconceivable 
to think that one person cannot live comfortably on a monthly 
income of $1,800.00. It should be noted that there are no 
children living at home; she has no obligations keeping her 
at home; Plaintiff is capable of finding employment to 
further increase her monthly income. In addition Plaintiff 
has been awarded personal property consisting of stocks, bonds, 
antiques and other liquid and readily marketable items of 
personal property. 
In citing English v English in her brief, Plaintiff 
seems to suggest that a gross income of $1,800.00 per month, 
without the benefit of income realizable from outside employ-
ment, is simply not enough to "prevent the wife from becoming 
a public charge". English v English 565 P2d at 411. 
Based upon the independent income of the Plaintiff 
and based upon the vast amounts of real and personal property 
awarded her in the decree of divorce, it seems somewhat un-
likely that the Plaintiff need ever become a public charge. 
This court has consistently held that the trial 
court has broad discretion in determining when and how much, 
if any, alimony is to be paid by one party to another. There 
are numerous Utah Supreme Court decisions dealing with the 
issue of sufficiency or insufficiency of alimony. These cases 
can all be reduced to the basic premise that an award of 
alimony by the trial court will not be disturbed unless the 
evidence clearly demonstrates a misapplication of the law or 
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an abuse of discretion. 
In Adams v Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979), at page 
149, this court held: 
An award of alimony . . . . is within the 
soun? discretion of the court, and will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings 
of the court or there has been a misappli-
cation of the law, or the court has clearly 
abused its discretion. 
In discussing the equitable powers of the trial 
court with respect to the distribution of property and the 
award of alimony, this court held in Curry v Curry, 7 Utah 
2d 198, 321 P.2d 939 (1958) as follows: 
The precept is well recognized that the 
trial court is vested with broad equitable 
powers in divorce matters and that its 
judgment will not be disturbed lightly, 
nor at all unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates against his findings, or 
there has been a plain abuse of discre-
tion, or a manifest injustice or inequity 
is wrought. 
7 Utah 2d at 203 
Clearly the evidence being reviewed by this court 
does not in any way suggest that the decision of the trial 
judge was in any way unjust or unequitable. Furthermore, the 
income available to the Plaintiff is more than sufficient to 
provide her with a comfortable standard of living. 
In her brief Plaintiff suggests that she will now 
be required to live off a severely depleted legacy and on 
an insufficient amount of alimony while the Defendant takes 
from the marriage any property that will provide an income 
in the future. It is interesting to note that the only 
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income producing property the Defendant was awarded are 1214 
shares of E-Systems stock valued at $57, 361. 00. Defendant 
was awarded no other income producing property. On the other 
'land, Plaintiff was awarded stocks, bonds and other marketable 
' securities with a fair market value at the time of trial of 
)112, 091. 00. In addition, Plaintiff was awarded antiques, 
valued at $57,125.00, furs, jewelry, one-half equity in the 
home, and miscellaneous items of personal property valued at 
che time of trial at $98,030.00. 
In her brief, Plaintiff alleges that she is being 
asked to accept a dep1eted legacy, when in fact the value of 
her trust has increased from May 28, 1956, when the principal 
sum to be managed was S66, 386. 01 to a value at the time of 
trial of $98,126.00. In addition, during that twenty-three 
and one-half year period, there were distributions to Plaintiff 
in the sum of $146,599.10. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony offered at the 
time of trial, the award of alimony to the Plaintiff, when 
viewed in conjunction with the vast amount of personal 
property awarded her, and her ability to obtain outside employ-
ment, is more than generous and well within the sound discre-
tionary judgment of the trial court. 
E. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Failing 
To Award Mrs. Warren Any Attorney's Fees. 
In her brief, Plaintiff alleges that she was ordered 
to pay a substantial majority of the debts; was left with a 
decreasing income; and that Defendant's income is six times 
as p;reat as hers. Plaintiff goes on to say that previous 
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decisions of this court have held that under such · circumstance; 
an award of attorney's fees is appropriate. 
There can be little argument with Plaintiff's con-
tention that the award of attorney's fees is within the 
discretion of the trial court. Bader v Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 
424 P.2d 150 (1967)' Adams v Adans, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 19 79)' 
Alldredge v Alldredge, 229 P.2d681 (Utah 1951). 
'·.!hat Plaintiff, however, has chosen to ignore is 
the fact that at the time of trial there was no evidence 
proffered to the court with respect to her need for an award 
of attorney's fees, Defendant's ability to pay, or the amount 
of attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff. In fact, 
counsel for Plaintiff, at a hearing subsequent to the trial, 
readily admitted that no evidence had been proffered to the 
court. (Tr.8, 9, 10; R.651, 652, 653). 
In that regard, this court has consistently held 
that unless there is competent evidence proffered at the time 
of trial to support an award of attorney's fees, none shall 
be awarded. In the case of Butler v Butler, 23 Utah 2d 259, 
461 P.2d 727 (1969) this court reversed the trial court's 
award of attorney's fees on the basis that there was no 
evidence in the record to sustain such an award. Such is the 
case here. 
Furthermore, the evidence in this case clearly demon· 
strates that the Plaintiff is financially capable of paying 
her own attorney's fees. She not only has a gross income, 
including alimony, of $1,800.00 per month, but she was also 
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awarded a very substantial amount of real and personal property. 
Plaintiff alleges that if she is required to pay her o-wn 
attorney' s fees, this will result in an additional burden, and 
reduce her monthly income. In that regard it must be remem-
b2red that the burden of paying attorney's fees rests equally 
heavy on Defendant's limited income. It would seem that the 
trial court's decision requiring the parties to pay their 
own costs and attorney's fees was equitable, and ought to be 
affirmed. 
F. Costs On Appeal. 
Upon review of the evidence presented at trial, it 
becomes readily apparent that Plaintiff's appeal of the decree 
of divorce is without merit, and, as has been the situation 
throughout these divorce proceedings, is a continuing 
attempt on her part to create both mental and financial 
hardship on the Defendant. Therefore, and in the event this 
court affirms the findings of the lower court, Defendant 
respectfully requests this court to award him his costs and 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
Conclusion 
Based on the testimony of witnesses and the evidence 
presented at the time of trial, and based upon the thorough 
consideration of the trial judge in arriving at a well 
reasoned decision, there can be little doubt that the trial 
judge was well within his discretionary powers in his award 
of real and personal property, debts and obligations, alimony, 
and attorney's fees. Furthermore, Plaintiff in her brief 
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has failed to demonstrate that the evidence presented at the 
trial was contrary to the trial court's decision. 
Based on the evidence the trial judge awarded the 
Plaintiff $267,246.00 in real and personal property, or 66% 
of the total, and awarded Defendant $135,540.00, or 34%; 
ordered Plaintiff to pay $9, 078. 00 of the debts and obligations 
of the parties, or 55% of the total, and ordered Defendant to 
pay 45~~; awarded Plaintiff $400. 00 per month alimony, which, 
when added to her independent income of $1, 400. 00 per month, 
provides Plaintiff with a gross monthly income of $1,800.00; 
and, based on the fact that there was no evidence to the 
contrary, ordered each party to pay their respective costs and 
attorney's fees. 
In her brief, Plaintiff attempts to convince this 
court that she has been dealt a severe financial blow by the 
trial court, and that it simply will not be possible for her 
to make ends meet. The facts of the case simply do not lead 
to that conclusion. With the substantial award of real and 
personal property, her monthly income of $1,800.00, and her 
ability to find outside employment to further increase her 
income, Plaintiff is financially secure, and ought to be able 
to live very comfortably on her income. 
The evidence presented at trial and subject to 
review by this court clearly demonstrates that the trial 
court's determination was equitable and clearly within the 
discretionary power of the tryer of facts. Therefore, the 
decision of the trial court and the decree of divorce should 
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be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 29th day of September, 1981, 
I personally delivered two copies of the foregoing Respondent's 
' brief to Paul H. Proctor, attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 
430 Ten Broadway Building, Salt Lake 
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